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Introduction 
This paper draws on the findings of six case studies on the role of parliaments in conflict 
and post-conflict situations that were prepared in the period January to June 2005 by 
the Centre for Liberal Strategies and its partners in the CIS countries studied. The case 
studies cover five countries (Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Ukraine) and the 
UN-administered Kosovo region, within the federation of Serbia and Montenegro. The 
purpose of this paper is to elaborate trends and problems, which are common to the 
region of Eastern Europe as a whole. In doing so, the paper resorts to certain generalizations 
which do not do justice to the complexity of the six individual case studies. 
The case studies focus on two groups of countries, each of which emerged after the 
collapse of the respective communist federation, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. This 
paper does not discuss the intensity of the conflicts nor their current status. However, 
it is important to accentuate the comparability of the political transformations the 
six studied countries went through and the institutional and international contexts 
of the examined political interactions/processes. 
Before discussing the role of parliaments in the selected case studies, it is important 
to point out that most of the parliaments analyzed were elected by generally free 
and competitive elections. However, these legislatures are by no means fully-fledged 
democratic institutions; instead, they are legislatures 
with a fragile, problematic legitimacy, struggling for emancipation from powerful executive bodies. 
Finally, it is presumed that post-communist 
parliaments, regardless of their degree of democratization, function as representative 
bodies where political elites may interact and reach political decisions. 
Therefore, the degree of democratization should be considered a secondary factor in 
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the assessment of the role of parliaments in conflict resolution. 
All six states have been the target of intensive international initiatives and pressure. In 
these efforts by international organizations and Western governments, parliamentarians 
have been among the key representatives of the targeted countries. As a rule, in all six 
countries the legislators were recognized as legitimate partners in efforts at conflict resolution, 
while the role of the legislatures was often marginal and subject to criticism. 
These commonalities make it possible to compare the roles that representative parliamentary 
bodies have played in conflict and post-conflict situations. In this vein, all 
of the studied countries also share similar cultural and historical backgrounds: they all 
constitute part of the broader Eastern Europe, and they have all experienced the long 
spells of communist rule, preceded by authoritarian rule of various sorts. Moreover, 
none of these countries have enjoyed stable and durable democratic governance. Their 
similar backgrounds facilitate comparative analysis and make it easier to assess the impact 
of institutional arrangements on the success and failure of democratization. 
The main goal of this paper is to present recommendations and suggestions to solve 
problems typical to the discussed countries and to other countries possessing similar 
characteristics. Needless to say, these recommendations need to be tailored appropriately 
to suit the specific context of each country. 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 1 discusses two methodological 
approaches in the study of parliaments. Section 2 introduces a taxonomy of different 
roles a parliament can play in conflict and post-conflict situations. Sections 3 and 
4 provide a brief assessment of the experiences of the six case studies and a more 
systematic discussion of the differences among them. Subsequently, sections 5 to 
7 outline three traps which the examined parliaments have fallen into: the traps of 
nationalism, majoritarianism, and the state of emergency. Section 8 summarizes the 
elements of success in the work of parliaments, according to the six case studies. Sections 
9 and 10 contain a final assessment of the performance of parliaments in the six 
countries under consideration as well as a set of recommendations. 
 
1. Studying the Role of Parliaments 
When assessing the role of parliaments in conflict and post-conflict situations, 
there is a preliminary methodological dilemma which needs to be addressed. On 
the one hand, there is a significant body of literature on the institutionalization of 
parliaments and on how they function to strengthen the routine operations of liberal 
democratic regimes. After the crisis of parliamentarism in the 1930s in Europe, 
there was a constitutional movement for the “rationalization of parliamentarianism” 
in order to strengthen parliamentary government, avoid government crises and 
ultimately to provide for a more efficient relationship between the legislative and 
executive branches in a democracy. Most of the post-WWII democratic constitutions, 
especially those in Germany and Italy, borrowed heavily from the ideas of 
this constitutional movement. One example is the introduction of the “constructive 
vote of no confidence” in the German Basic Law, which is an instrument designed to 
avert governmental crises. 
Yet, despite the abundance of literature on the strengthening and rationalizing of 
parliamentarism, little attention has been paid to the specific roles of parliaments 
in preventing and managing conflicts and in dealing with their consequences. In 
extreme political situations, there has always been a shift of focus to the executive 
branch, which is supposed to be the main actor. There are of course good reasons 
for such a shift – the executive has the advantage of acting swiftly, while legislatures, 
as collective bodies, are usually more difficult to mobilize, and their actions are often 
not as decisive and unanimous as the actions of governments and presidents. As a 
result, there has been little systematic analysis of the role of legislatures in conflict 
and post-conflict situations. 
The present paper faces two groups of methodological options, each with different 
initial assumptions: 
Approach 1: 
(i) Institutionalization and strengthening of parliament is always beneficial in a 
representative democracy; 
(ii) Increasing the role of parliaments in conflict prevention, management and resolution 
necessitates enhancing the general capacity of the legislature in terms of 
legislative powers, oversight of the executive, material resources, etc. 
Approach 2: 
(i) General strengthening of parliaments may not prevent their marginalization 
in a conflict situation, or, even worse, may lead to their involvement as an exacerbating 
factor in the crisis/conflict; 
(ii) Attention should be focused on those factors which prevent parliaments from 
playing a constructive role in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
Below, we choose to employ the second approach. We recognize that a general 
strengthening of parliament, as one of the key bodies of liberal democracy, is almost 
always beneficial. Yet, the paper focuses on the specific roles of parliament in dealing 
with conflicts, and on the basis of these roles we elaborate problems and suggest 
possible remedies. 
2. Roles of Parliament in Conflict Situations 
The roles of parliament could be divided roughly into two main groups. The first group 
covers cases in which the role of parliament was not constructive, while the second 
group accounts for those cases where the role of parliament was constructive. Indeed, 
in group one, parliament had the potential to provoke a conflict or even exacerbate it. 
Although all of the roles that parliament has are formally legitimate in a constitutional 
democracy, their abuse might lead to the worsening of a conflict situation. 
Conflict provocation: 
(i) Expression of national/popular sovereignty and forum for identity politics 
One of the main functions of the representative body in a liberal democracy is the 
expression of popular and national sovereignty. A lot of the acts adopted by parliaments, 
such as new constitutions, declarations of independence and language laws, 
aim to define and promote specific nation-building projects. Most of the case studies 
we have examined emphasize the fact that after gaining independence from the 
Soviet and Yugoslav Federations, legislatures have been busy adopting acts with the 
specific aim of promoting national ideals. However, in a pluralistic society such acts 
may contradict the aspirations of certain (minority) groups on the territory of a given 
country and, as such, may lead to a conflict situation. 
(ii) Instruments for majoritarian oppression of the minority 
When the traditions to tolerate minorities and protect individual rights (which was 
the case in the six countries we studied) have not been established in a given polity, 
democracy may turn into an instrument of majoritarian oppression of groups and 
individuals. The political opposition may be systematically marginalized by the ruling 
parties. This can be done through administrative harassment, control over the media 
and draining the opposition of resources. All of these instruments of majoritarian 
oppression require some form of legislative action in order to be realized. This may 
come in the form of laws regulating the media or party funding, tax and party laws, or 
simply by means of lax parliamentary oversight of abusive action by the government. 
In this sense, if parliament becomes a tool for majoritarian oppression of the opposition, 
it may provoke or exacerbate a conflict. 
(iii) Subservient bodies to a powerful executive 
Parliaments need a degree of independence from the executive in order to be effective in 
a parliamentary democracy. Of course, in a modern democracy, governments and the executive 
always dominate the work of the legislature by providing most of the draft laws, 
and by dictating the government’s will over the opposition and recalcitrant backbenchers. 
Yet, there is one form of executive domination, which is particularly dangerous: when 
the executive (be it a president or a government) is able to control the composition of 
the legislature. This control could be exercised by manipulation of elections, by influence 
over the media or by depriving the opposition of resources. If the executive dominates 
the parliament in such a way, a country’s democracy is problematic, and a crisis or conflict 
might be expected, as the Ukrainian case study suggests. In any event, subservient legislatures 
are not conducive to the establishment of a healthy democratic regime. 
The second group of roles played by parliaments in conflict and post-conflict situations 
tries to capture the positive experience. These are roles which have been conducive 
to the successful resolution of a conflict situation. 
Conflict prevention 
(i) Parliaments as constitutionally constrained powerful players in a system of 
separated powers 
When parliaments or other centers of power are absolute sovereigns, the result is 
likely to be the abuse of prerogatives,  ultimately leading to the alienation of 
some members of the polity. On the contrary, when constitutional bodies participate 
in a system of separation of powers with checks and balances, the likelihood of 
abuse of powers decreases. This may seem a trivial observation but its force is often 
underestimated. Many of the conflicts discussed in our case studies have been exacerbated 
or even provoked by excessive concentration of power in legislative majorities 
or powerful executives. 
(ii) Guarantors of political pluralism: fora for the opposition 
Parliaments are the key bodies when it comes to building trust among members of 
a given community. Parliaments can adopt the norms guaranteeing the rights of minorities 
and provide a forum for the political opposition to express its interests. If they 
play this role well, the outbreak of violent conflict in a country becomes less likely. 
(iii) Instruments of political learning: 
Parliaments are instruments of political learning. In none of the countries we studied 
were there established democratic traditions. Therefore, parliaments could facilitate 
the accumulation of political knowledge by providing the citizens with the possibility 
to explore different political alternatives. Parliament, as the main forum for the opposition, 
becomes the place where alternative political platforms are articulated and 
defended. In case governmental policies fail, parliaments provide new, viable political 
solutions and new actors who could carry them through. If parliaments are weak and/ 
or the opposition is completely marginalized, the articulation of political alternatives is 
stalled, and a country could enter into a period of repetition of mistakes. Needless to 
say, government failures and the lack of political alternatives drives conflicts outside 
the political arena, where outbreaks of violence may become more likely. 
3. Experiences of the Six Case Study Countries 
This section provides a brief evaluation of the experiences of the six countries: 
(i)Parliaments have more often than not played a marginal or even conflict-exacerbating 
role; 
(ii) The main reason for the failure of parliaments to play a constructive role: in 
all six cases, parliaments have been mainly seen and used by the public as 
instruments for nation-state building after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Conflicts have been mostly about the issue 
of national self-determination (with the exception of Ukraine); 
 (iii) Part of the problem facing the six countries was that the existing national and 
political projects for their future conflicted with each other. In this respect, it 
is useful to compare the failures of these countries to deal with conflict with 
the success stories of Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. One major 
difference that comes to mind was the prospect for EU integration, which 
was lacking in both the former Yugoslavia, and especially in the Caucasus and 
in Moldova and Ukraine. The EU accession perspective provided a universally 
accepted political project, which was instrumental in keeping communities 
together, or, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, in ensuring a peaceful transition 
to national independence. 
4. Dimensions on which the Case Studies Differ 
This section discusses four dimensions on which the six case-studies differ from each 
other: 
Time of conflict 
The time when a potential conflict escalated to cause a political/social crisis is an important 
factor to take into account. In most cases, this happened during the first phase 
of democratization or transition: the liberalization of the authoritarian regime. But even 
within this first stage there are important distinctions to be made. In many post-communist 
countries, the prolonged stage of political liberalization has coincided with the 
initial stage of a state-building process, when the parliament lacked established and ef- 
ficient practices and had not yet developed efficient communications with the other 
state and public institutions because the horizontal accountability networks had been 
working only at the federal level. To summarize the capacity of parliament to channel 
conflicts and contribute to their peaceful settlement correlates mostly with the process 
of the establishment and social entrenchment of nation-state institutions. 
Analysis should not differentiate between those countries which could rely on developed 
state institutions (e.g., Yugoslavia) and those which had very peripheral and 
underdeveloped government structures (e.g., Moldova) during the collapse of the 
federal state, but rather between countries where the conflicts erupted during or right 
after the secession (e.g., Georgia and Moldova) and countries where viable state institutions 
were established more than a decade before the emergence of conflict (e.g., 
Macedonia and Ukraine). 
Attitude towards international peacekeeping efforts 
There is a substantial distinction between cases where international peacekeeping 
missions were a key player in conflict resolution and cases where these missions have 
had little or no impact. But for the purpose of the current report, what matters is the 
attitude of the representative political elites. Two examples are symptomatic: 
(i) Yugoslavia/Serbia and the unanimously negative attitude of MPs towards international 
pressure, resulting from the persistent application of sanctions by the 
international community. 
“There was no international assistance, since the country was for most of the 1990s under 
heavy international sanctions. They (the sanctions) were first introduced by the EC in 
1991, then in several waves by the UN Security Council, starting in May 1992. After suspension 
of some sanctions at the end of 1995 and a year later, they were, as it was already 
said, reintroduced exactly because of the excessive use of force by the Serbian police and 
the Army in Kosovo, in Spring 1988.”1 
(ii) Moldova with the gradual shift in the attitudes of the political elite from accepting 
the presence of the Soviet army and relying on membership in the 
CIS and the mediatory role of Russia to recognizing the role of the Council of 
Europe and unanimously approving partnership for accession to the EU as a 
priority” 
“Consequently, on the first day of its activity, the newly elected Parliament unanimously 
approved the Declaration of Political Partnership for achieving the objectives of accession 
to EU. The document provides for the consensus of the four factions on the consistent 
and irreversible promotion of the strategic course towards European accession.”2 
Separation of powers 
It is important to distinguish between states with strong presidential powers and 
states with parliamentary systems in which the president’s powers are mostly symbolic. 
The interaction between parliament and the president has a strong explanatory 
value in all cases to the extent that even presidents with symbolic powers play 
a crucial role in conflict resolution because of the emergency powers bestowed on 
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each head of state. However, this is not a distinction which could explain the weaknesses 
or the strengths of legislatures as preventors of conflicts or mediators in con- 
flict resolution in the selected group of countries. 
An important dimension of diversity stems from the different role/powers of presidents 
in day-to-day politics. It is empirically proven that presidents have a tendency 
to impede the establishment of responsive and vibrant political parties and that 
they seek to promote a presidential majority in parliament, which as a whole  
delays the development of a competitive party system.3 Parliaments with obstructed 
party competition tend to underestimate the risk of political exclusion. 
The degree of party system institutionalization 
It is common for a state’s first election to set the main political cleavages for the coming 
decades. However, this was not necessarily the case in the countries under investigation: 
Georgia is a symptomatic case with its dramatic shifts in the main parties’ 
characteristics, while Moldova may be considered as an exemplary case of a stable, 
though evolving, party system. It is important to figure out how these dramatic shifts 
in voters’ preferences and party alignments affect the legitimacy of parliament in 
conflict or post-conflict situations. 
5. The Trap of National Sovereignty 
Evidence from the six case studies suggests that in conflict and post-conflict situations, 
parliaments tend to get trapped, taking action which seems attractive and 
legitimate at the intuitive level, but which ultimately tends to create a potential for 
conflict. 
The first of these traps is legislative obsession with national sovereignty. Parliaments in 
the six case studies have all been vulnerable to such an obsession and have undertaken 
the following actions: 
(i) Adoption of a constitution legally entrenching a contested national project: 
Georgia, Serbia, Moldova, and to a lesser degree, Macedonia; 
(ii) Adoption of legislation insensitive to national, ethnic and religious minorities: 
Georgia, Serbia, Macedonia and Moldova. Such legislative acts concern, 
in particular, official language issues, state symbols, regional autonomy issues 
and educational matters; 
(iii) Denial of regional autonomy: with the exceptions of Moldova and Ukraine, 
in all other case studies, the parliaments had been active in denying regional 
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autonomy; 
 (iv) Exclusion of minority representation through prohibitions or through specially 
designed electoral laws; boycott of parliament by the minority (e.g., Kosovo); 
(v) Rejection (by the parliamentary majority) of cooperation with international 
organizations (e.g., Serbia); 
(vi) Avoidance of significant external conditionality (either by NATO or EU). Conditionalities 
are generally efficient when they are accompanied by the provision 
of significant benefits by the foreign partners. Out of the six countries, 
probably only Macedonia is in a situation in which the foreign conditionalities 
are coupled with prospects for EU accession. Even there, however, the Ohrid 
Agreement was accepted very reluctantly; 
(vii) Creation and encouragement of nationalistic media and civil society organisations: 
in virtually all the studied countries there was a degree of political control 
over the public electronic media (particularly evident during Milosevic’s 
regime) – parliaments have facilitated the exercise of such control. 
6. The Trap of Majoritarianism 
The second trap into which parliaments managing conflict tend to fall is the trap of 
majoritarianism. Parliaments fall into this trap when the majority becomes an instrument 
for the suppression of the political opposition. The following activities are signs 
of aggressive majoritarianism: 
(i) Marginalization and fragmentation of the political opposition through control 
over the mass media, administrative harassment, starving the opposition of 
funding, administrative bias in favour of governmental parties and their supporters, 
and even through openly criminal methods such as political violence 
and bribery. Unfortunately, these problems have all plagued the political life of 
the studied countries. Political killings and harassment of the opposition were 
quite common in Milosevic’s Yugoslavia, and violence against political opponents 
has also taken place in Ukraine, Macedonia and Georgia. Administrative 
harassment against the opposition has been common in Serbia, Ukraine, and 
to a lesser extent in Macedonia. The same is true of government favoritism: 
granting favors to businesses close to the political majority and the government. 
All of these developments have been facilitated by parliaments, or at 
least have taken place with the tacit approval of parliamentary bodies, which 
have all but resigned from their oversight function; 
 (ii) Lack of an independent judiciary – governmental control over the personnel 
and budgetary policies of the judiciary. The independence of the judiciary has 
been problematic in all six studied countries. The role of parliament in ensuring 
independence of the judiciary is crucial – the legislature first needs to adopt 
proper laws, and then to monitor closely their implementation especially on 
issues concerning personnel policies and the budget of the judiciary; 
1.3 Election fraud and manipulation of electoral laws in favour of governmental 
parties. The most egregious cases of this kind led to the recent “revolutions” 
in Georgia and Ukraine. Electoral manipulation has been common also in Serbia, 
and to a lesser extent in Macedonia. The Ukrainian example clearly shows 
that manipulation is much more difficult when parliament actively opposes it: 
there, the parliamentary reaction to the allegations that the President had manipulated 
the elections was a key element in resolving the crisis of the “orange 
revolution”; 
7. The Traps of the State of Exception 
and the State of Emergency 
The third trap consists of the temptation to resort exclusively to the powers of the 
executive in the resolution of conflict situations, hereby marginalizing parliament 
completely: 
(i) In exceptional circumstances, the role of parliament is reduced and the executive 
comes to the forefront: this is the main assumption of the third trap, 
popular since the German constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt introduced it in 
the 1930s. This argument is extremely popular in the six case studies. Actually, 
all their constitutions are designed in such a way so as to make a charismatic 
president the ultimate guarantor of the constitutional order. It is no surprise 
that in most of these countries the birth of the new republic was intimately 
linked with the figure of a powerful (and charismatic) president: Milosevic in 
Yugoslavia, Gligorov in Macedonia and Shevardnadze in Georgia. In Moldova 
and Ukraine, presidents also have claimed to be the indispensable figures in 
the establishment of the independent state and its subsequent development 
(e.g., Kuchma and Voronin). 
(ii) The Schmittean rationale of super-presidentialism permeates the constitutional 
regimes of Ukraine, Serbia, and Georgia. The “orange revolution” signaled 
the beginning of a process of parliamentary rehabilitation vis-à-vis the 
presidency, but the results of this process are by no means conclusive. On 
the basis of the evidence of the six countries, it is probably warranted to argue 
that “super-presidential” models of government marginalize parliaments 
more than any other form of government, making the emancipation of the 
legislature very difficult in such regimes. 
(iii) One of the reasons for this difficult emancipation is the role of “oligarchs” 
– powerful businessmen who build their financial empires mostly on the basis 
of government favours and on their connections with the executive. The 
political power of oligarchs transforms the political process into a process of 
corporate representation, which further marginalizes parliaments. 
(iV) The lack of internal democracy in political parties is another problem typical 
to all six case studies, but also for the East Europe in general. It leads to diminishing 
confidence in the mechanism of representation, which in turn has a 
negative impact on the confidence in the legislature. 
8. Elements of Success 
It should be noted that the traps discussed in the previous sections have at times 
been avoided by the parliaments in the six case studies. Their stories are by no means 
stories of unmitigated parliamentary failure. Below we list some examples of positive 
roles played by the legislatures in the management of conflicts: 
(i) Self-restraint in the pursuit of national sovereignty: One of the best examples 
of legislative self-restraint in the pursuit of national sovereignty is the Moldovan 
parliament’s granting of autonomy to the Gagauz region. Also, the Parliament 
of Macedonia was a key actor in the process leading to the Ohrid Agreement, 
despite the fact that the accord was not reached within the assembly 
itself. 
(ii) Self-restraint by the political majority and the establishment of a viable opposition: 
Instances of self-restraint were most visible in Macedonia during 
the conflict, and especially after the Ohrid Agreement was reached. Similar 
instances can be found in the Ukrainian and Moldovan case studies. The existence 
and strength of the Macedonian opposition to the right-wing government 
of Lupcho Georgievski facilitated the relatively smooth implementation 
of the Ohrid Agreement: when this government fell from power, the socialist 
opposition took over and avoided governmental crisis. Parliaments are effective 
when they produce and articulate alternative policies – the Macedonian 
parliament was able to do so, and this explains in great part its positive role in 
the overall management of the conflict situation. 
(iii) Rationalized parliamentarianism? It is difficult to speak of a stable process of 
rationalization of parliamentarianism in any of the six studied countries. Yet, 
elements of success in this regard also exist. Macedonia stands out somewhat, 
given that a fairly serious effort is underway to make the legislature into an 
effective counterweight to the executive branch. Moldova appears to be following 
suit, while the other four legislatures are struggling to compete with 
powerful and aggressive executives. The existence of a strong parliamentary 
opposition in Macedonia is a good sign. In Ukraine and Georgia the opposition 
was also strong, but its strength was translated not so much into a strengthening 
of the parliament as it did to strengthen extra-parliamentary “revolutionary” 
activities. This side-stepping of parliament, although probably positive in 
the short-run, is questionable from a long-term governance perspective. 
(iv) Parliamentarianism as a learning process? As mentioned above, parliaments 
have played a positive role as instruments for political learning. Again, Macedonia 
and Moldova stand out, Especially in the former case, parliament has 
been a breeding ground for political alternatives. 
9. Overall Assessment of the Role of Parliaments 
in Conflicts 
(i) Conflict Prevention: parliaments sometimes take measures and enact laws, 
which provoke conflicts. In this regard parliament’s role in avoiding conflict, 
by avoiding the traps discussed above, can be significant. 
The conflicts discussed in the reports are mainly local conflicts (with the exception 
of Ukraine) of a limited duration. It is noteworthy that these conflicts emerged in territories 
where social peace had existed for over forty years. Another peculiarity is the 
relative weakness of the legislative institutions vis-à-vis the executive – in all countries 
under consideration, parliaments have been secondary bodies, in many cases 
rubberstamping decisions of single-party governments, with short working sessions 
and non-professional MPs. 
The political context outlined above suggests that in the post-communist states 
examined, parliaments played a secondary role to the executive during violent 
conflicts. However, there are two noticeable exceptions, the first which is the proactive 
preventive role played by the Ukrainian parliament described below: 
 
DEMOCRATISING SECURITY IN TRANSITION STATES 
During the 2004 presidential elections, the parliament was a battlefield on which the progovernment 
majority and the de-facto opposition challenged each other’s presidential 
candidates. Under conditions of information blockade, the parliament was the only major 
forum for the opposition forces to voice their opinions. When opening the 6th session 
of the parliament on September 7, 2004, Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn announced that the 
parliament must demonstrate profound responsibility so that the totally agitated present- 
day situation in Ukraine did not turn into yet another lost historic chance for the 
country. He described the deteriorating public divide as a national security challenge 
and called for measures to ensure stability in the transition period, prevent a vacuum 
of state power and keep the election processes within democratic norms. He also initiated 
the parliament’s leading role in monitoring implementation of the election law by 
establishing a special parliamentary commission, approved by 239 votes. The vote on the 
special ad hoc commission signified the de facto collapse of the pro-presidential and progovernment 
majority after the majority coordinator Stepan Hawrysh had announced on 
behalf of the majority the boycott of the commission-to-be. The parliamentary majority 
crisis in 2004 was reflected in major changes in the composition of the factions and 
groups. Within four months …. factions that supported the government’s presidential 
candidate lost substantial number of members, many of whom moved to the faction of 
Speaker Lytvyn. 
Following the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine on November 21, 
2004, recognized as badly fraudulent by various domestic and international observers, 
the mass protests against vote manipulations began in Kyiv and a number of other major 
cities of Ukraine. The events, known as the “Orange Revolution” involved the participation 
of hundreds of thousands of people – supporters of either of the two presidential 
candidates, then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and his challenger, leader of the united 
opposition forces Victor Yushchenko. At the height of the conflict the parliament of 
Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, remained the only legitimate body of power and played 
a critical role in preventing the violent development of the conflict and releasing the 
confrontation.4 
The exceptional role played by the Ukrainian parliament was the outcome of fifteen 
years of parliamentary practice, the initial five years which were characterised by the 
dominance of the parliament over the weak presidential institution and the last five 
years which resulted in the effective prevention of the unconstitutional attempts of 
the president to further strengthen his powers and to establish a dominant pro-presidential 
party in parliament. 
The second exception is the case of the parliament of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
which openly disregarded the dangers of escalation of the Kosovo conflict, as 
the overwhelming majority of parliamentary parties acted as “instigators of chauvinism, 
ethnic conflicts and wars”.5 In fact, the parliament deliberately excluded ethnic 
Albanians from politics and explicitly and consistently followed a policy of violation 
of local minority political rights, thus provoking and later intensifying the Kosovo 
conflict. 
[Iinternationalization of the conflict that had been going on ever since the autonomous 
status of Kosovo had been revoked by the Serbian Assembly in 1989. 
Elections for both the Serbian Assembly (held in August, 1996) and for the FRY Assembly 
(held in November, 1997) brought to power a coalition of parties that were key 
 instigators of chauvinism, ethnic conflicts and wars in Serbia: Milosevic’s Socialist Party of 
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Serbia, his wife’s party United Left and Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party. In fact, Milosevic 
continued to rule, only with partners that were partly new, but this time – unlike 
before – his partners were eager and capable of making much bigger influence within 
the coalition… 
The whole ruling coalition, to be sure, showed clear signs that it would tolerate neither 
an Albanian uprising, nor the enhancement of Albanian rights in Kosovo. Having lost 
previous wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, the Serbian regime was not ready to allow 
yet another defeat on the territory it fully controlled with the help of extremely large and 
potent armed forces.5 
The role of parliaments in the other cases is much less pronounced, as for example in 
the case of Georgia where the “sins of omission” (underestimating the danger of local 
secession or openly promoting nationalism) are to be explained with the very early 
stages of the political liberalization process, when the legislature was just emerging 
out of the authoritarian institutions. 
The series of events that eventually led to the outbreak of conflict in South Ossetia is 
sometimes termed the “war of laws.” It involved three layers of authority: The central 
government of the USSR, the Union Republic of Georgia, and the authorities of the autonomous 
entities within the Republic of Georgia. It started in November 1988, when a 
decree, known as On the State Program for the Georgian Language, was introduced. This 
decree caused serious complications in the relations with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
In 1989, the Georgian Supreme Council, a nominally elected body in the best Soviet 
traditions, put forward a language program which was seen as discriminating by most of 
the minorities. This increased the feeling of insecurity and fuelled ethnic consolidation 
among the South Ossetians. In the spring of 1989, Ademon Nykhaz, the South Ossetian 
Popular Front, addressed the Abkhazian people in an open letter supporting their secessionist 
aspirations. In September 1989, the South Ossetian authorities came up with an 
initiative of giving equal status to Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian in the autonomous 
district, but very soon, the local Council made a decision to make Ossetian the state language 
of the region. During the same month, Ademon Nykhaz appealed to Moscow asking 
for the unification with North Ossetia. In November, the South Ossetian Autonomous 
District Council put forward a demand to upgrade the autonomous region’s status to that 
of the Autonomous Republic of South Ossetia. Georgia responded by declaring its right 
to veto the Union-level laws and to break away from the union. This led to the escalation 
of tensions and the period between November 1989 and January 1990 -- essentially the 
first stage of the violent conflict -- was marked with inter-ethnic clashes. 
In April 1990, the Supreme Council of the USSR adopted a law which generally enhanced 
the position of autonomous regions vis-à-vis the central governments of Union Republics. 
The step that was taken by the Georgian Supreme Council in response gave a further 
impetus to the South Ossetians’ secessionist claims. In August 1990, the Georgian Supreme 
Council adopted a law that banned regional parties (i.e., Ademon Nykhaz, as well 
as the Abkhazian Popular Front) from participating in the upcoming Georgian Supreme 
Council elections in October. Zviad Gamsakhurdia succeeded in forcing this law through 
by blocking Georgia’s main railroad line. This act could only be interpreted by the South 
Ossetians as a means of disenfranchising them and cutting them off from influence. In 
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September, the South Ossetian Supreme Council unilaterally upgraded the status of the 
autonomous district calling it the Independent Soviet Democratic Republic. The Georgian 
Supreme Council, which had been elected in October, reacted promptly. It canceled 
the results of the election to South Ossetia’s new legislative body and abolished the 
South Ossetian Autonomous District as a separate entity within the Republic of Georgia 
on 11 December 1990. The Supreme Council was unanimous in this decision. This led 
to the resumption of the violent inter-ethnic clashes between Georgians and Ossetians. 
Thus, although the processes that eventually led to the outbreak of the conflict in South 
Ossetia started much earlier, Georgia’s first elected legislature contributed to the escalation 
of tension which resulted in war.6 
The distinction between the parliament of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and 
the first Georgian legislature was that in the latter an aggressive nationalist strategy 
could not survive for long. It did not even endure for a single parliamentary mandate 
since Gamsakhurdia only had very limited resources – there were no efficient government 
institutions nor institutionalized party structures. 
(ii) Conflict Resolution: parliaments have very limited resources to deal with 
conflicts which have turned violent, especially secessionist conflicts where 
interests of other countries are involved as well. During violent conflict, the 
executive steps in although parliament is crucial in terms of granting post 
facto control over the legitimacy of executive action and in adopting amnesty 
laws and so forth (see below). 
(iii)Negotiations and Settlements: Parliaments are not particularly well suited 
for negotiating settlements, but they are indispensable for their endorsement 
and ultimate legitimation: the Ohrid Agreement stands out as an example 
in this regard. 
The direct role played by the parliaments in the case studies during the peace negotiations 
and settlements is rather insignificant. The Macedonian parliament is 
the only legislature that played a role by passing (without deliberation) constitutional 
amendments agreed to by the conflicting parties. 
The Framework Agreement, signed in Ohrid on August 13, 2001, represented a formal 
end of confrontations between the Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian extremists 
of the National Liberation Army (NLA) in the conflict that started in March the 
same year. The Macedonian parliament was barely politically involved in the phase at the 
very beginning of the conflict, but mostly in the post-conflict implementation process of 
the Agreement. Both pre- and post-conflict periods were politically tense. As Albanian 
extremists were demilitarised, a process of radical change was drawn up for the old constitutional 
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order of the republic. Certain political structures used every possible method 
to obstruct implementation of the peace process and a tough political battle was fought 
over those stressful months. 
Nevertheless, on November 16, 2001, two months after the NLA disbanded, the Macedonian 
parliament adopted the agreed constitutional amendments. This signified the 
conclusion of an important chapter in Macedonian history in which the Macedonian parliament 
played only an occasional role, and rarely fulfilled an essential political role.7 
Though underestimated in the report, the role of the Macedonian parliament in legitimizing 
the constitutional and legal amendments envisaged in the Ohrid Agreement 
is extremely important. It can even be considered as being vital for the settlement 
of the conflict. The debates “for” and “against” the referendum initiative, the 
rejection of the proposals to limit the constitutional amendments and the decision 
to avoid the symbolic change of the constitutional preamble made the new constitution 
acceptable to the public. 
Though parliamentary party fractions were the major agents in the debate on constitutional 
amendments, the process was open to civil society organizations, including 
the Macedonian Church. The debate outcome was also heavily influenced 
and de facto sanctioned by external / international agencies. 
Parliament’s role in implementing the constitutional amendment into laws on local 
government and on amnesty is also significant. The Macedonian parliament 
approved “a package of legal reforms demanded by the Ohrid Agreement. These 
included the electoral laws, state administration legislation regulating the use of 
non-majority languages and a law to guarantee better representation of minorities 
in state institutions. Compromise and accommodation had produced a hard-won 
victory against ethnic polarization and confrontation.” 
(iv) Post-conflict Recovery: Here parliaments do have a key role to play. They 
need to avoid the traps of nationalism, majoritarianism and subservience to 
the executive, and they ought to become rationalised legislatures. 
In Moldova and Georgia the participation of parliaments in the negotiations and 
de-escalation of conflict were even more limited than in the Macedonian case. In 
both countries, the post-communist governments lost control over the secessionist 
territories. Therefore, the parliaments could only influence the post-conflict situation 
to a very limited extent, mostly by approving the multi-lateral or bi-lateral 
negotiations. 
Since the ceasefire agreements were signed with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian 
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Parliament’s role regarding the conflicts has been essentially negligible. Both patterns 
can be explained by the tendency of the executive branch’s domination over the 
legislative authority (with only short-lived exceptions in 1992-1995 and between 2002 
and 2003) when the decisions were made by the “ruling team” which unified the president 
and the government and the parliamentary majority. 
Another reason why Parliament did little to prevent violence and to contribute to the 
negotiating process afterwards is the fact that the Abkhazian and South Ossetian secessionist 
parties were not represented in the Georgian Parliament (each had their own 
legislative body around which the events were concentrated) and, therefore, could not 
use it as a forum for dialogue between each other. 
The status of the conflicts in Georgia -- they are often referred to as “frozen” -- has also 
contributed a great deal to the lack of involvement of Parliament in the aftermath of the 
ceasefire agreements. This essentially means tvvhat Georgia has no jurisdiction over the 
conflict territories, both regions are de facto independent and have their own leadership, 
they are not recognized by the international community as independent states, but there 
is no large-scale violence or an active armed confrontation there either. This implies the 
ongoing process of negotiation is the prerogative of the executive authority in Georgia.8 
In Moldova it is appropriate to speak of the constructive role played by parliament 
during the peace-building process. There, parliament’s main contribution was the 
adoption of a new constitution and laws which guaranteed minority rights and 
regional autonomy. 
The Moldovan Parliament wanted to put into evidence that human and minorities rights 
protection is a priority and to obtain in advance a kind of sympathy and support of international 
community in solving separatist conflicts. 
At the same time, Article 111 of the Constitution stipulates that, “The places on the left 
bank of the Dniester river, as well as certain other places in the south of the Republic 
of Moldova may be granted special forms of autonomy according to special statutory 
provisions of organic law”. The new Constitution was supported by the parliamentary 
majority of about 80% of seats in the newly elected 1994 Parliament. The pro-democratic 
and pro-Western Christian Democrats and liberals from the Intellectuals’ and Peasants’ 
Bloc refrained to support the new Constitution as it stipulated in article 13 that the state 
language was Moldovan, not Romanian as they insisted. 
The most important success of the Parliament in solving the separatist conflict was the 
adoption on December 23, 1994 of the Law on the special juridical status of Gagauzia 
(Gagauz-Yeri) which in principle solved the Gagauz separatist conflict. The law established 
the political system of an “autonomous territorial formation” within the Republic 
of Moldova. The draft law was elaborated by the parliamentary majority supported by 
the Socialist Movement with the consent of the Government and the President. The opposition 
was against the bill as it stated the right of Gagauz to leave Moldova in case it 
loses its independence. 
According to the law, in Gagauzia judicial, legislative, and executive branches exercise 
authority within the framework of Moldova. The People’s Assembly, or parliament (Khalk 
Toplushu), of Gagauzia is a unicameral body of thirty-five deputies, elected for terms no 
longer than four years in duration. The law gives the assembly the power to nullify decrees 
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and regulations of the executive committee if the decrees or regulations conflict 
with the code and other existing laws. The Governor (Bashkan) is the official Supreme 
person of Gagauzia. All public administration authorities of Gagauzia are subordinated 
to the Bashkan. The Bashkan is ab initio member of the Government of the Republic of 
Moldova. 
No doubt that the success of the Parliament in solving the Gagauz separatist conflict was 
due to the fact that it was an internal one, without the implication of foreign countries and 
army as is the case of Transdniestrian one. However, the Moldovan Parliament continued 
to improve the human rights conditions. Through its Decision No.1447-XIII of January 28, 
1998, the Parliament adopted a program to adjust the legislation of the Republic of Moldova 
to the provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. It obliges the Government to submit to the Parliament the 
proposals of modification of the legislative acts that provide directly or indirectly for the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. At the same time, the parliamentary Committee 
on Human Rights examines all draft laws to be considered and adopted or rejected 
by the Parliament as regards their compliance with the human rights standards. The Law 
No.1349-XIII on the Parliamentary Advocates of 17.10.1997 established an independent 
body consisting of three parliament-appointed Parliamentary Advocates (Ombudsmen), 
together with additional personnel from the Moldovan Centre for Human Rights, a legal 
entity with its own budget.9 
What guarantees the efficiency of the process is the alteration of party majorities, 
which each seek to implement alternative strategies, as well as shifts in the balance 
of power, thus ensuring that neither the executive (the President) nor the legislature 
comes to dominate the political landscape. 
The Moldovan case soundly illustrates the gradual nature of the peace-building process. 
The evolution of the adopted party strategies and institutional solutions, as 
well as the evolution of the partnership with international institutions, have been 
achieved despite the slow and limited democratization of the political system. 
It is also appropriate to discuss the role of the Georgian parliament in peacebuilding. 
(v) Parliament’s Role in Transitional Administrations: here again, parliaments can 
potentially play a very significant role. Unfortunately, evidence from our case 
studies is not encouraging. 
The peace-building activities of the Kosovo parliament are not only limited but also 
rather inefficient. It is acknowledged in the report that the executive is the internationally 
recognized and politically effective branch, while the legislature lacks legitimacy 
and is as a rule “sidelined” by the executive or by the peacekeeping international 
administration. 
There is definitely a link between parliamentary crisis and the increase of tensions in general. 
There were two cases when the Kosovo Assembly insisted that they be consulted on 
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issues that were of major interest to Kosovars and international community: 
1. The issue of Kosovo agreeing to participate in talks with Belgrade in October 2003: 
These were the first high-level talks between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian officials. 
However, the then Kosovar Prime Minister, Bajram Rexhepi, stood by his decision not 
to attend the talks, brokered by the European Union. The Prime Minister’s argument 
for not going was that the government had not received authorisation from the Kosovo 
assembly. The international community tried to avoid the discussion of this issue in 
the parliament, since they were not certain of the outcome of the discussion. 
2. The issue of implementing the decentralization policy framework, which called for 
implementing different models of decentralization in five pilot municipalities. The 
selection of municipalities and the whole decentralization debate was politicized beyond 
repair. The assembly pressured the executive branch not to start implementing 
anything without the consent of the assembly. The international community did not 
favour any debate that would change the already agreed plans of decentralization. 
This issue led to the polarization of the opposition and even a split within the government 
coalition.11 
Hence it is more relevant to discuss the activities of the Kosovo parliament in the context 
of interaction with the international peacekeeping forces and the transitional 
administration. According to the report on Kosovo, this interaction is also in the stage 
of seeking efficient institutionalization. 
As mentioned above, UNMIK very often has tried to push for decisions that affect Kosovo 
through individuals that they identify as allies within institutions at the cost of sidelining 
the role of the institutions, particularly the role of Assembly. This has many times created 
unnecessary tensions between the UN and local institutions. International communities’ 
issues have a sense of urgency attached to them so it always seems that the international 
community has no time for processes of building local ownership. There were many cases 
when the international community discouraged debate out of fear that the outcome of 
debate may not be the one they like. This fear and distrust in Kosovar institutions has not 
been productive and has resulted in outcomes that were not sustainable.12 
10. Main Conclusions and Recommendations 
(i) Notions of parliamentary sovereignty as an expression of national sovereignty 
are dangerous. Parliaments should be treated as constitutionally constrained 
bodies, working within a frame of domestically and internationally recognised 
rights; 
(ii) The existence of a viable opposition is key to the establishment of parliament 
as a guarantor of political pluralism: the opposition should have sufficient 
funding, international contacts, media exposure and so forth; 
(iii) Super-presidentialism is dangerous. It leads to the marginalisation of the political 
opposition and ultimately reduces pluralism and denies representation, 
which is a step towards violent conflict. The separation of powers should be 
well-entrenched; 
(iv) International actors should attempt to enter, where possible, into processes of 
imposing conditionality in return for membership in prestigious clubs or other 
benefits; 
(v) There is no parliamentarianism without political parties. Much more attention 
should be paid to the internal organization of political parties, their funding, 
their levels of internal democracy and on public trust and confidence. The 
parliamentary process extends beyond the walls of the legislature, as it also 
covers areas such as coalition negotiations and coalition building, and the political 
education of its members and supporters. Sustained efforts are needed 
to improve the current practices; 
(vi) Thus far, political education has been entrusted either with the government 
or with the nongovernmental sector. Hence, the German experience, where 
political parties (through their foundations) have been and still are involved in 
political education, is worth exploring. This approach will strengthen the influence 
of parliaments vis-à-vis the executive in the area of political education. 
11 Argjentina Grazhdani, The Role of the Kosovo Parliament in Conflict and Post-conflict Situations. 
Paper written for the UNDP sponsored project on the role of parliaments in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. 
12 Ibid. 
 
